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Abstract
his article analyses the Indonesian eơorts to resolve ast human rihts 
auses under the mechanism of transitional ustice folloin the donfall of 
resident oeharto on ay 2͝, ͥͥͤ͝. he focus of analysis is the imlementation 
of transitional ustice in the cases of Aceh, aua, and ast imor durin the 
transitional eriod. his article shos that the eơorts to enforce transitional 
ustice in these cases have een faced ith ostacles. Althouh there have een 
notale eơorts in terms of oth udicial and non-udicial to enforce transitional 
ustice, the Ƥnal results are not satisfactory. ransitional ustice mechanism to 
resolve ast human rihts auses as imlemented only ith half-aked and 
suorted ith half-hearted. As a result, it has failed to rin ustice for the 
victims. There are lessons can and should be learned from these transitional 
ustice cases for resolvin other ast human rihts abuse cases in Indonesia 
today. The current Indonesian overnment should ay attention to the lessons 
in order to resolve ast human rihts violations in accordance ith its romise 
durin residential election camain in 20͝͠. therise, it is likely to reeat 
the same mistake and failure of ustice dealin ith ast human rihts violations.
Key words: Transitional Justice, uman ihts, Indonesia, Aceh, aua, ast 
Timor
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the olitical turmoil in ͥͥͤ͝, Indonesia has immediately been faced 
ith ho the best ay to deal ith ast human rihts abuses committed by 
the reressive redecessor reime.1 The victims and civil societies have been 
ushin the ost-oeharto overnments to enforce transitional ustice since the 
early years of transition to democracy, hich is oularly called Era Reformasi 
ȋthe eformation AeȌ. A number of victim-based rous, community based-
movements, and human rihts non-overnmental oranizations ȋ
Ȍ have 
emered durin this transitional eriod seekin ustice and addressin human 
rihts issues. In the meantime, international community has also ressured 
Indonesia to deal with transitional justice measures.
The issue of ast human rihts abuses remain relevant in Indonesia today. 
urin the residential election camain in 201͠, the issue was oliticized to 
ersuade the voters. The residential and vice-residential candidates of Joko 
idodo dan . Jusuf alla leded to solve ast human rihts abuses if they are 
elected to be the resident and the vice-resident. 	ollowin their inauuration 
as the resident and the ice-resident of the eublic of Indonesia on 20 
ctober 201͠, eole have become imatient waitin for the imlementation of 
their romise. It took si months after the inauuration the current overnment 
beins to take an initial ste resolvin ast human rihts abuses.2 n 21 Aril 
201͡, the Indonesian Attorney 
eneral revealed that the overnment will rioritize 
seven cases of ast human rihts violations to be resolved, these of Talansari, 
amena, asior, the forced disaearance of ersons, the mysterious shootins, 
the 
30 I, and the ay 1ͥͥͤ riot.3 In his Ƥrst tate of the ation address at 
the arliament uildin on 1͠ Auust 201͡, resident Joko idodo delivered that 
the overnment refers to choose reconciliation mechanism dealin with ast 
1  Satya Arinanto, Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Transisi Politik di Indonesia, Jakarta: Pusat Studi Hukum Tata Negara Fakultas Hukum, 
Universitas Indonesia, 2003, p. 37 & 56.
2  “Pemerintah Bertekad Tuntaskan Kasus Lama, Kompas, 22 April 2015, p. 4; “Presiden Pastikan Penuntasan Kasus Masa Lalu”, 
Kompas, 29 May 2015, p. 3.
3  “Ini Tujuh Kasus Pelanggaran HAM yang Akan Diusut Pemerintahan Jokowi”, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/04/21/17120411/
Ini.Tujuh.Kasus.Pelanggaran.HAM.yang.Akan.Diusut.Pemerintahan.Jokowi?utm_campaign=related&utm_medium=bp-kompas&utm_
source=news&> (accessed 11 November 2015).
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human rihts violations.͠ It means that truth-seekin and criminal rosecution 
mechanism dealin with ast human rihts abuses is likely not a choice. It is 
therefore uestionable whether it can be imlemented on the basis of transitional 
justice mechanism. 5
This article aims to elore the eơorts and obstacles of the imlementation 
of transitional justice in Indonesia esecially in the cases of Aceh, aua, and 
ast Timor. This article arues that it is critically imortant to understand 
these cases as a mirror to resolve other ast human rihts violations. esite 
there have been eơorts to enforce transitional justice, it is aarently not easy 
to imlement it successfully. ith reard to the mentioned cases, the eơorts 
to enforce transitional justice found obstacles and therefore it did not ive 
satisfactory results. There are two central uestions to be discussed here. 	irst, to 
what etent transitional justice mechanism has been imlemented to coe with 
ast human rihts abusesǫ econd, what lesson can and should be learned from 
transitional justice mechanism in the cases of Aceh, aua, and ast Timorǫ To 
answer the uestions, the analysis of the article uses relevant studies, reorts, 
and academic works that have been written by scholars and researchers.
The article is structured as follows. It beins by reviewin theoretically 
common resonses to human rihts violations under transitional justice 
mechanism. The article then roceeds by describin in eneral ast human rihts 
abuses committed by the Indonesian ew rder reime. It is followed by focusin 
on three cases of the most notable of human rihts violationsǣ Aceh, aua, and 
ast Timor. The net section discusses the imlementation of transitional justice 
mechanisms in Indonesia in rotectin human rihts esecially in relation to the 
mentioned three cases. A conclusion will be rovided at the end of the article 
emhasizin the lesson of the mentioned three cases.
4  “Presiden Inginkan Rekonsiliasi Nasional Terkait Pelanggaran HAM”, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/08/14/10575231/
Presiden.Inginkan.Rekonsiliasi.Nasional.Terkait.Pelanggaran.HAM> (accessed 11 November 2015).
5  For example, see the opinions of Albert Hasibuan, “Penyelesaian Beban Sejarah”, Kompas, 24 April 2015, p. 7; Mugiyanto, “Rekon-
siliasi dan Partisipasi Korban”, Kompas, 16 June 2015, p. 7; Albert Hasibuan, “Penyelesaian Pelanggaran Berat HAM”, Kompas, 25 
July 2015, p. 7; and Artidjo Alkostar, “HAM dan Keadilan Transisional”, Kompas, 30 July 2015, p. 6.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Transitional Justice: Common Responses to Human Rights Violations
The Indonesian transitional overnments inherited ast human rihts 
violations from the revious reime. As a conseuence, there is leal and moral 
obliation to resolve ast human rihts violations in accordance with human rihts 
values and standards. In addition, the amended Indonesian 1ͥ͠5 onstitution 
stronly uarantees human rihts for all Indonesian citizens. The ost-oeharto 
overnments have therefore been ushed to enforce transitional justice for the 
victims. In liht of this, an overview on theory of transitional justice is necessary 
to eamine its alicability to Indonesian transitional justice case. This section 
therefore concerns theory of transitional justice as formulated by scholars and 
used as a ractical framework of transitional justice in other countries.
Theoretically, there is no a universal deƤnition of transitional justice. uti 

. Teitel deƤnes transitional justice as ǲthe concetion of justice associated with 
eriods of olitical chane, characterized by leal resonses to confront the 
wrondoins of reressive redecessor reimesǳ.6 Accordin to Jon lster, ǲȑtȒ
ransitional justice is made u of the rocesses of trials, ures, and rearations 
that take lace after the transition from one olitical reime to another.7 Roht-
Arriaza refer to deƤne transitional justice as the ǲset of ractices, mechanisms 
and concerns that arise followin a eriod of conƪict, civil strife or reression, 
and that are aimed directly at confrontin and dealin with ast violations of 
human rihts and humanitarian lawǳ.8 	or . ritz, as cited by ynthia . orne, 
ǲȑtȒransitional justice is most basically deƤned as the way a society confronts 
the wrondoins in its ast, with the oal of obtainin some combination of 
truth, justice, rule of law, and durable eaceǳ.9 In the view of the U ecretary-

eneral oƤ Annan, transitional justice is deƤned as ǲthe full set of rocesses 
and mechanism associated with a societyǯs attemts to come to terms with a 
6  Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16, 2003, p. 69.
7  Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 1. 
8  As cited by Clara Sandoval Villalba, “Transitional Justice: Key Concepts, Processes and Challenges”, BrieƤng Paper, Institute for 
Democracy and Conƪict Resolution, the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway, 2011, p. 3.
9  Cynthia M. Horne, “Lustration, Transitional Justice, and Social Trust in Post-Communist Countries. Repairing or Wresting the Ties 
that Bind?”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 66, No. 2, March 2014, p. 226.
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leacy of lare-scale ast abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliationǳ.10
Althouh there is no scholarly areement reardin the definition of 
transitional justice, it is obvious that transitional justice dealin with human 
rihts issues. Transitional justice is a concet to reckon ast ross human rihts 
violations committed by redecessor reime. It is often viewed as a crucial 
issue for new democracies that are strulin to et throuh transitional hase 
and ursue democratic consolidation successfully. asically, the main urose 
of transitional justice is to brin justice for victims and to end imunity to 
eretrators. In the words of va rems, ǲhuman rihts norms reuire that a 
osttransition democratic reime brin to justice the eretrators of ross human 
rihts violations under the revious reressive reimeǳ.11 In liht of this, ǲȑtȒhe 
actual rosecution and conviction of eretrators after reime chane andȀor 
the end of armed conƪict is the most sectacular asect of transitional justice.ǳ 12
Referrin to a study conducted by the ƥce of the United ations ih 
ommissioner for uman Rihts ȋRȌ in 2009, lara andoval illalba oints 
out that the core of transitional justice basically has four rocesses as followsǣ
Usually, a transition encomasses a justice process, to brin eretrators of 
mass atrocities to justice and to unish them for the crimes committedǢ a 
reparation process, to redress victims of atrocities for the harm suơeredǢ a 
truth process, to fully investiate atrocities so that society discovers what 
haened durin the reressionȀconƪict, who committed the atrocities, and 
where the remains of the victims lieǢ and an institutional reform rocess, to 
ensure that such atrocities do not haen aain.13
entral to transitional justice is seekin justice for victims. Ruti 
 Teitel notes 
that ǲthe concetion of justice in eriods of olitical chane is etraordinary and 
constructivistǣ It is alternately constituted by, and constitutive of, the transitionǳ.1͠ 
Teitel then distinuishes Ƥve tyes of justice under transitional justice frameworkǣ 
10  As cited by Clara Sandoval Villalba, loc.cit.
11  Eva Brems, “Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, Vol. 5, 2011, p. 298.
12  Ibid.
13  Clara Sandoval Villalba, op.cit., p. 3. Original emphasizes.
14  Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 6.
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criminal justice, historical justice, rearatory justice, administrative justice, and 
constitutional justice.15 To enforce transitional justice, these Ƥve tyes of justice 
should be taken into account throuhout transitional justice rocesses.
ith resect to justice, the establishment of truth commissions is believed 
as an imortant art of transitional justice framework. eole, esecially victims, 
need to know what eactly haened in the ast, why they became the victims, 
and who must resonsible for ast atrocities. All this can be facilitated by a truth 
commission. Thus, ǲȑtȒruth seekin is an essential asect of a societyǯs eơorts 
to address a violent or authoritarian astǳ.16 Accordin to riscilla . aynerǣ
A truth commission ȋ1Ȍ is focused on ast, rather than onoin, eventsǢ 
ȋ2Ȍ investiates a attern of events that took lace over a eriod of timeǢ 
ȋ3Ȍ enaes directly and broadly with the aơected oulation, atherin 
information on their eeriencesǢ ȋ͠Ȍ is a temorary body, with the aim of 
concludin with a Ƥnal reortǢ and ȋ5Ȍ is oƥcially authorized or emowered 
by the state under review.17 
Ruti 
. Teitel oints out that ǲȑaȒ truth commission is an oƥcial body, 
often created by a national overnment, to investiate, document, and reort 
uon human rihts abuses within a country over a seciƤed eriod of timeǳ.18 
In the view of ayner, the desired oals of truth commissions are ǲto discover, 
clarify, and formally acknowlede ast abusesǢ to address the needs of victimsǢ to 
ǲcounter imunityǳ and advance individual accountabilityǢ to outline institutional 
resonsibility and recommend reformsǢ and to romote reconciliation and reduce 
conƪict over the astǳ.19 onetheless, ǲthe eectations for truth commissions 
are often much reater than what these bodies can in fact reasonably achieveǳ.20 
oreover, ǲȑiȒn ractice, it is likely to occur that seekin justice to human rihts 
violations of the ast is sidelined by the urent needs to ursue eace, security, 
stability and social cohesion.ǳ21
15  Ibid.
16  Eva Brems, op.cit., p. 287.
17  Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, Second Edition, New York: 
Routledge, 2011, p. 11-12.
18  Ibid., p. 78.
19  Ibid., p. 20.
20  Ibid., p. 5.
21  Eva Brems, op.cit., p. 282.
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It should be added that seekin justice is not the only measure in transitional 
justice. Reconciliation is also an imortant element of transitional justice. The 
enforcement of justice can be meaninless if it is unable to revent the same 
atrocities in the future. To be sure, reconciliation is needed to heal the trauma, 
to harmonize societies, to unite national interation, and to build a better future. 
evertheless, in ractice sometimes there is a tension and dilemma between 
justice mechanism and reconciliation mechanism. lin kaar oints out that 
ǲȑjȒustice and reconciliation have been seen both as conƪictin and as mutually 
reinforcinǳ.22 ith reard to this notion, ǲublicly revealin the truth about 
ast abuses has been considered an obstacle to reconciliation ȋesecially in the 
short runȌ but also a rereuisite for reconciliation ȋin the lon runȌǳ.23 Several 
transitional justice cases suest that ǲȑrȒeconciliation may be conceived as a 
oal or a rocess or bothǳ.2͠
The eerience of transitional justice in several ost-communist countries 
in entral and astern uroe and the former Soviet Union shows that there is 
a relationshi between transitional justice, lustration and social trust buildin. 
	or these countries, lustration olicy is an interal art of transitional justice 
measures. As a result of bitter eerience livin under totalitarian reimes, the 
levels of institutional and interersonal trust amon ost-communist societies are 
very low and it is not conducive for new democracies. In this vein, ǲȑlȒustration 
rorammes are framed as intentional trust-buildin measures, desined to 
restore trust in ublic institutions, interersonal trust, and trust in overnment, 
and thereby ositively contribute to the rocess of democratisation.ǳ25 To make it 
leitimate, lustration must be based on laws. asically, ǲȑlȒustration laws tyically 
revent individuals reistered as collaborators in the Ƥles of former state security 
aencies from occuyin certain ositions in the ost-communist overnmentǳ.26 
In uroean human rihts system, lustration is allowed in rincile under the 
uroean onvention of uman Rihts ȋRȌ. owever, the uroean ourt of 
22  Elin Skaar, “Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective”, Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2012, p. 64.
23  Ibid.
24  Ibid., p. 65.
25  Cynthia M. Horne, op.cit., p. 225-226.
26  Eva Brems, op.cit., p. 295.
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uman Rihts ȋtRȌ ǲhas set some limits on the allowed scoe of lustration 
measuresǳ.27
avin described the concet of transitional justice, it can be arued that 
transitional justice has two diơerent levels. At minimum level, transitional justice 
should consist of truth-seekin rocess, trial and justice rocess, and rearation 
rocess. At maimum level, transitional justice should also include reconciliation 
and lustration rocess. It is the view of this article that transitional justice in the 
case of Indonesia should have taken the maimum level in order to uarantee its 
successful imlementation. In addition, this article arues that the imlementation 
of transitional justice for the case of Indonesia should not be limited to the 
eriod of olitical chane which is called as transitional eriod. The momentum 
of transitional justice has now out of dated if it is only limited to transitional 
eriod because Indonesia has been away from democratic transition hase and 
now continuin its democratic consolidation hase. 	or that reason, ast human 
rihts violations should remain be resolved under transitional justice mechanism 
even thouh Indonesian has now accomlished its democratic transition rocess. 
The uestion is to what etent the imlementation of Indonesian transitional 
justice has been in conformity with transitional justice theory.
B. Past Human Rights Abuses of the New Order Regime
efore discussin transitional justice in the ost-ew rder era, it is imortant 
to overview the loomy ortrait of Indonesian human rihts in the eriod of 
the ew rder reime. bviously, transitional justice in the ost-ew rder is 
dealin with human rihts violations committed by the ew rder reime. The 
ew rder reime emered out of the assassination of seven hih-level Indonesian 
military oƥcers on 30 Setember 1965 in an attemt to unconstitutionally seize 
the ower and destabilize the country. Soon after this traic event, 
eneral 
Soeharto, who had an imortant osition in Indonesian military hierarchy at the 
time, took an initiative destroyin the alleed Indonesian communist and leftist 
rous and then formally bannin the eistence of the Indonesian ommunist 
27  Ibid., p. 296.
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Party (Partai Komunis Indonesiaǣ PIȌ throuhout Indonesia. The chaos sread 
out across the country and was likely to become a civil war. Between 1965 and 
1966 it is estimated 500,000 to a million eole had been killed28 and tens of 
thousands was imrisoned and sent to the detention cams without a fair trial. 
	urthermore, all manifestations of communism were strictly rohibited durin 
the ew rder reime. The anti-communism camain was maniulated and 
leitimized by the reime to threaten, frihten and control its oonents.29
In relation to the issue above, it is imortant to note that the decision of 
the Indonesian onstitutional ourt on 2͠ 	ebruary 200͠ has rehabilitated 
olitical riht (riht to be candidateȌ of the e-PI members to be elected as 
national and local arliament members. The onstitutional ourt arued that 
Article 60 (Ȍ of aw umber 12 of 2003, which rohibited the e-PI members 
to be arliament candidates, is a discriminatory rovision and therefore it is 
unconstitutional.30 In addition, an initiative to eose the 1965 mass atrocities 
is recently taken by civil society from Indonesia and also outside the country 
in terms of the so-called ǲthe International Peoleǯs Tribunal 1965ǳ held in The 
aue, The etherlands, from ovember 10 to ovember 13, 2015. This is not 
a formal trial, but it is conducted resemblin a court format. There are judes, 
rosecutors, reistrar, witnesses, and eert witnesses durin the hearin rocess 
of the Tribunal.31 The Tribunal becomes an international forum to reveal the truth. 
Since it is only a seudo-court, the decision of the Tribunal is certainly not leally 
bindin. Perhas the Tribunal will be a turnin oint to attract more attention 
from international communities on the 1965 case. Indonesians themselves have 
ro and contra comments reardin the Tribunal, however. eanwhile, the 
Indonesian 
overnment ives a neative resonse to the Tribunal.32
28  There is no exact estimation of the death victims, unfortunately. But it is believed that a moderate number is no less than 500,000 
peoples had been killed at the time as a result of horizontal conƪicts and the involvement of the Indonesian military. See, for 
example, Robert Cribb (ed.), The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991; Mary S. Zurbuchen, “History, Memory, and the “1965 Incident” in Indonesia”, Asian Survey, 
Vol. 42, No. 4, July/August, 2002, p. 565-566.
29  See, for example, Ariel Heryanto, State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging, Oxon: Routledge, 2006; 
Wijaya Herlambang, Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru Melegitimasi Anti-Komunisme Melalui Sastra dan Film, 
Serpong, Tangerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri, 2013. 
30  See, Case Number 011-017/PUU-I/2003. 
31  See, http://1965tribunal.org/1965-tribunal-hearings-the-judges/; http://1965tribunal.org/1965-tribunal-hearings-the-prosecutors/; 
http://1965tribunal.org/1965-tribunal-hearings-the-registrar/ (accessed 13 November 2015).
32  “Government brushes oơ Hague tribunal on 1965 massacre”, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/11/10/government-brushes-
hague-tribunal-1965-massacre.html# (accessed 13 November 2015).
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bviously, the emerence of the ew rder reime was started by ross 
human rihts violations. Throuhout the ew rder reime eriod, reressive 
and oressive manner aainst civilians had been used as an eơective measure 
to consolidate and reserve the dominant and heemonic ower of the reime. It 
was also used to uarantee economic olicies and develoment rorams as well 
as to reserve olitical stability and national unity.33 In doin so, ǲSoehartoǯs ew 
rder reime used terror and violence to control the eole and oress various 
social layers and sectors that oosed it.ǳ3͠ uman rihts violations committed 
by the state durin the authoritarian ew rder reime were therefore ramant 
both in terms of both individual detentions and mass killins. The scale and 
the variety of human rihts violation occurred durin the eriod of the reime 
show clearly that the reime had a notorious human record. Such a condition 
demonstrated what Ariel eryanto calls as ǲstate terrorismǳ which is deƤned 
as ǲa series of state-sonsored camains that induce intense and widesread 
fear over a lare oulationǳ.35 The most notable violations of human rihts are 
includin the mysterious shootins (known penembakan misterius or PetrusȌ of 
susected criminals in urban centres, the massacre of oslem demonstrators 
in Tanjun Priok, orth Jakarta, in 198͠, the massacre of villaers in Talan 
Sari, amun, in 1989, the attack on the oƥce of the Indonesian emocratic 
Party (PIȌ, the forcibly disaearance of ro-democracy activists in 1997-1998, 
the killin of student demonstrators of Trisakti University in 1998 as well as 
the incidents of Semani I in 1998 and Semani II in 1999, and the riots in 
Jakarta in May 1998.36
The other most notable of human rihts violations are in Aceh, Paua, and 
ast Timor, which will be elaborated in the net ararahs. iơerent from the 
human rihts violations mentioned above which dealin with olitical reasons, 
human rihts violations in these three rovinces are more related to searatist 
issues. It is noted that ǲȑsȒecurity forces committed systematic, lare-scale human 
33  Mohtar Mas’oed, Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989.
34  Hilmar Farid and Rikardo Simarmatra, The Struggle for Truth and Justice: A Survey of Transitional Justice Initiatives Throughout 
Indonesia. International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper Series, January 2004, p. 15. Available at [http://ictj.org/].
35  Ariel Heryanto, op.cit., p. 19.
36  See, for example, ICTJ and Kontras, Indonesia Derailed: Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto: A Joint Report, 
March 2011, p. 94-102. Available at [http://ictj.org/]; Suzannah Linton, “Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia”, Singapore Year 
Book of International Law, 10 SYBIL, 2006, p. 1-3.
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rihts violations aainst civilians in the contet of oerations aainst indeendence 
movements in ast Timor, Aceh, and Paua.ǳ37 onseuently, it created a hostile 
relationshi between Indonesian central overnment and these areas.
uman rihts violations in Aceh were as a result of the conƪict between 
the disruntled Acehnese and the central overnment bean on ͠ ecember 
1976. ed by a charismatic leader asan di Tiro, the Acehnese formed Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (
AMȌ (	ree Aceh MovementȌ and then declared unilaterally 
Acehnese indeendence from Indonesia. The dissatisfaction with the central 
overnment olicies was the reason for searatist asiration. It was justiƤed by 
historical claim that Aceh had never been acceded to Dutch colonial rule. As a 
conseuence, for them, Aceh was never become art of Indonesia as roclaimed 
by Indonesian state founders on 17 Auust 19͠5. Acehnese believed that they 
were discriminated and their rich natural resources were reedily eloited by 
Indonesian central overnment.38 In resonse to this, President Soeharto sent 
thousands of troos to Aceh to suressin the searatist movement. As a result, 
the military win of the 
AM and the Indonesian security forces had involved 
in weaon conƪicts for years. Innocent civilians had become the victims of this 
rotracted conƪict. In the middle of the army conƪict, di Tiro and a few 
AM 
leaders ƪed to Sweden in 1980 and continued their strule from there. The 
army conƪict in Aceh still continued, however. To strenthen its suression 
to the 
AM, President Soeharto in 1989 declared Aceh as a Military eration 
Area (Daerah Operasi Militerǣ DMȌ. The declaration justiƤed sendin more 
troos, weaons, and other military euiment to Aceh. Many human rihts 
abuses occurred durin the eriod of DM. The military oeration was then 
stoed just after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998.39
uman rihts violations have also occurred in Paua and est Paua, formerly 
Irian Jaya (hereafter referred as PauaȌ. Paua is located in the eastern-most 
of Indonesia. thnically and historically, Paua is diơerent from the rest of the 
37  ICTJ and Kontras, ibid., p. 11. 
38  Scott Cunliơe, et. al., Negotiating Peace in Indonesia: Prospects for Building Peace and Upholding Justice in Maluku and Aceh, ICTJ 
and ELSAM, June 2009, p. 17. Available at [http://ictj.org/].
39  Ibid.
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country. Paua is rich in natural resources such as old, timber, and oil. It has 
attracted multinational cororations to eloit it, such as 	reeort McMoran, 
a US based multinational comany. Initially, Paua was not art of Indonesia 
when it declared its indeendence on 17 Auust 19͠5 and ained sovereinty 
reconition from the Dutch on 27 December 19͠9. Paua has oƥcially become 
art of Indonesia based on the areement between the Dutch and the newly 
country Indonesia statin that what was the Dutch ast Indies becomin arts 
of Indonesia. owever, Paua remained under Dutch authority until it was 
handed over to Indonesian control in 1962 after achievin an areement between 
the two which was mediated by the United ations. As art of the areement, 
a referendum of self-determination under the U ausices was held in 1969 
to determine the Ƥnal status of Paua. The result is Paua become a art of 
Indonesia which is endorsed by the U. This is not the end of the story of 
Paua, however. onƪicts and discontents have been arisin in this reion since 
then.͠0 As a result, ǲȑfȒrom the early 1960s throuh the resent, Paua has been 
the site of numerous human rihts abuses by Indonesian security forces in the 
contet of both military oerations aainst a small armed searatist movement 
and the suression of nonviolent indeendence activists.ǳ͠1
The net reion where human rihts violations also occurred is ast Timor 
(also known as Timor-esteȌ. Unlike Paua, the status of ast Timor as art of 
Indonesia from the very beinnin was disuted by international community. 
ast Timor was colonized by Portuuese, not by the Dutch, and therefore it 
was not art of Indonesia. The interation of ast Timor into Indonesia was a 
result of Indonesian occuation and anneation in 1976 with the suort of ro-
interationist ast Timorese factions and the silent suort of anti-communist 
western countries such as the USA and Australia. However, the majority of 
countries did not reconize ast Timor as the 27th rovince of Indonesia. nly 
several countries, such as Australia, had initially reconized it either de facto or de 
jure. The U never endorsed it, however. The ast Timorese oonent factions had 
40  ICTJ and ELSHAM, The Past That Has Not Passed: Human Rights Violations in Papua Before and After Reformasi, June 2012, p. 3. 
Available at [http://ictj.org/]; ICTJ and Kontras, Indonesia Derailed:, op.cit., p. 48-49.
41  ICTJ and ELSHAM, ibid.
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resisted the interation and then committed to armed strule aainst Indonesia 
until 1999. 	ihtin between the two was therefore unavoidable. Human rihts 
abuses had occurred since the beinnin of the occuation in 1976 until the 
end of rule of Indonesia in the reion in 1999 in terms of arbitrary detention, 
torture, violence seual oơence, forced dislacement, enforced disaearance, 
and murder that took hundred thousand lives. The most notable human rihts 
abuses were the cases of the Dili massacre or also known Santa ruz massacre 
in 1991 when the Indonesian military cracked down ast Timorese who were 
attendin a ro-indeendence march and the violence and destruction of 1999 
after the referendum to determine the Ƥnal status of ast Timor. The result of 
the referendum, held on 30 Auust 1999, was 78 er cent of the ast Timorese 
oulation had rejected secial autonomy within Indonesia oơered by the 
Indonesian overnment. It means that ast Timorese eole chose to be an 
indeendent state from Indonesia. Soon after that Indonesia withdrew from the 
ast Timor after rulin the reion for 23 years.͠2
C. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS IN INDONESIA TO 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In resonse to ublic demands and to certain etent international ressures, 
Indonesian Ƥnally areed to reoen several ast cases of human rihts violations. 
The ost-Soeharto overnments rovided and established suortin instruments 
for the imlementation of transitional justice. A number of notable achievements 
are rovidin leal base for commissions of inuiry, truth and reconciliation 
commissions, an aency for the rotection of victims and witnesses, establishin 
ermanent human rihts courts and ad hoc human riht courts for seciƤc 
cases, insertin human rihts uarantees into the amended national constitution, 
and ratifyin international conventions on human rihts.͠3 In addition, the 
Indonesian arliament assed the aw umber 26 of 2000 which ave the 
ational Human Rihts ommission (omnas HAMȌ the ower to conduct 
42  Caitlin Reiger and Marieke Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect, ICJT, March 2006, p. 4-6. Available at 
[http://ictj.org/]; ICJT, JSMP, Impunity in Timor-Leste: Can the Serious Crimes Investigation Team Make a Diơerence?, June 2010, p. 
7. Available at [http://ictj.org/].
43  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 1.
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inuiries and determine whether crimes aainst humanity or enocide were 
committed, and then recommend investiation and rosecution to the Attorney 

eneralǯs ƥce (A
Ȍ.͠͠ In short, as hito imura oints out, ǲȑtȒransitional 
justice mechanisms in the Indonesian eerience can be roued into four major 
cateoriesǣ investiations, trials, truth and reconciliation, and aoloyǳ.͠5
The sub-section below focuses on three major cases of human rihts violations 
as illustrated aboveǣ the cases of Aceh, Paua, and ast Timor. It discusses 
transitional justice mechanisms in relation to the mentioned cases.
1. Transitional Justice in Aceh
In 1999, the Indonesian overnment oƥcially aoloized to Acehnese 
for ast human rihts abuses durin the military oerations in the area. 
However, the military conƪict between the Indonesian overnment and 
searatist 
AM was still continued. Althouh there was a series of meetin 
between the Indonesian overnment and the 
AM facilitated by the third 
arties to end the old conƪict and reach a eaceful resolution, it was only 
after an earthquake of 9.0 on the Richter scale hit Aceh and followed by 
Indian cean tsunami swet over much of Aceh on 26 Setember 200͠ 
the eaceful resolution could be achieved by both arties. It is estimated 
aroimately 150,000 Acehnese dead and thousands more dislaced in 
one day. As a result of this traic tsunami, both arties had areed to o to 
the table talkin about eace areement. The net year after tsunami, on 
15 Auust 2005, both arties Ƥnally sined a eretual eace areement in 
Helsinki (the Helsinki Memorandum of UnderstandinȌ after Ƥve rounds of 
meetin brokered by the former 	innish President Martti Ahtisaari. The thirty 
years conƪict between the overnment of Indonesia and 
AM has now been 
over.͠6 Under the MoU Aceh enjoys self-overnment and secial autonomy.
It is admitted that, ǲȑfȒrom the ersective of transitional justice, the 
Helsinki MoU aeared to reresent a ste forward in Indonesiaǯs attemts 
44  Ibid., p. 3.
45  Ehito Kimura, “The Problem of Transitional Justice in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Middle East Institute, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/
content/problem-transitional-justice-post-suharto-indonesia, (accessed on March 12, 2014).
46  Scott Cunliơe, et. al., op.cit , p. 17.
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to address ast human rihts violationsǳ.͠7 The Helsinki MoU contains many 
transitional justice elements, includinǣ
% Amnesties for those imrisoned for their articiation in 
AM 
activities, with a reaƥrmation of the overnmentǯs obliations to 
adhere to international human rihts instruments.
% Secified benchmarks and timetables for the demobilization, 
disarmament, and decommissionin of 
AM and Indonesian security 
forces in Aceh.
% A reinteration roram for former combatants, olitical risoners, 
and ǲcivilians who suơered a demonstrable lossǳ.
% Provisions for the establishment of the Human Rihts ourt and 
Truth and Reconciliation ommission (TRȌ for Aceh.
% SeciƤed institutional reforms to hel strenthen the rule of law.͠8
Related to truth and justice seekin, the MoU mandated Indonesia 
to establish a TR and human rihts court for Aceh whose jurisdiction 
over human rihts violations committed only after 2000. This obliation 
was included in the aw on the 
overnin of Aceh, a law that transferred 
most rovisions of the MoU into national law, assed in Auust 2006 by 
the Indonesian Parliament. et, the overnment has not created either 
one.͠9 The rovision of the establishment of human court itself subjected 
to diơerent interretation on the courtǯs jurisdiction, whether retroactive or 
non-retroactive. The Indonesian arliament decided that the rosecution 
could not be enforced retroactively. Such limitation has made the rosecution 
ǲby and lare meaninless as a tool to rovide accountability for abuses 
committed durin the conƪictǳ.50 
In the meantime, the leality of the aw umber 27 of 200͠ on Truth 
and Reconciliation ommission as a leal base to establish a TR both for 
Aceh and for other cases was deemed unconstitutional by the onstitutional 
ourt due to it allowed an amnesty for eretrators before bein eliible for 
47  Ibid., p. 22.
48  International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “The Need for Accountability: The Helsinki Memorandum Five Years”, August 
2010, [http://ictj.org/sites/default/Ƥles/ICTJ-Indonesia-Aceh-MoU-2010-English.pdf], (accessed on April 13, 2014).
49  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 51.
50  Ross Clarke, Galuh Wandita, and Samsidar, Considering Victims: The Aceh Peace Process from a Transitional Justice Perspective, 
Occasional Paper Series, International Center for Transitional Justice, January 2008, p. 33. Available at [http://ictj.org/].
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rearations and therefore considered aainst human rotection uaranteed 
in Indonesiaǯs 19͠5 onstitution. Uneectedly, the onstitutional ourt 
invalidated the whole of the aw, rather than only the related rovision.51 
Such a decision created leal uncertainty reardin the establishment of a 
national TR, while the members of the TR had not been aointed yet.52 
To make a new leislation on the TR, a new draft law has been reared by 
the overnment for a discussion with the arliament, but not much olitical 
suort to ass it.53 Disaointed with such a condition, victimsǯ rous and 
civil societies in Aced then initiated to establish a local TR by and for Aceh 
within the framework of the Helsinki eace areement.5͠ However, it is not 
clear about the roress of the roosed local TR.
The MoU also rovided a rearation mechanism in terms of comensation 
ayment to those aơected by the conƪict such as former combatants, 
olitical risoners, and all civilian who suơered a demonstrable loss. The 
comensation consist of suitable farmland, emloyment, or social security for 
those who unable to work. To imlement the comensation and an etensive 
reinteration roram, the central overnment had established the Aceh 
Reinteration Aency (BRAȌ. Some ͊26.5 million had been disbursed to 1,72͠ 
villaes that received the money aroimately from 60 million to 170 million 
ruiahs.55  However, the imlementation was not too successful since it did 
not address victim-seciƤc needs or rovide any kind of acknowledement 
of their suơerin. It was then discontinued in 2007. utside the scheme 
of the MoU, reviously there was another form of rearation initiated by 
the overnor of Aceh in 2002 for the death or disaeared victimsǯ family 
members. Under the so-called diyat comensation, meanin traditional 
Islamic comensation, aroimately 20,000 victims had received an annually 
51  See, the Decision of the Constitutional Court on Case Number 006/PUU-IV/2006 promulgated on December 7, 2006. The Petitioners 
were civil society groups and human rights defenders asking the Constitutional Court to invalidate Article 1 Section (9), Article 27, 
and Article 44 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law since the Articles were considered unconstitutional. According to 
the Decision of the Constitutional Court, the whole of the Law is unconstitutional, not only the Articles asked by the Petitioners. 
As a result, the Law is invalid wholly and cannot be applied to establish a TRC.  
52  Scott Cunliơe, et. al., op.cit., p. 21.
53  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 14.
54  Ross Clarke, Galuh Wandita, and Samsidar, op.cit., p. 41-45.
55  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 66.
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ayment of between ͊200 and ͊300 for limited years and transferred directly 
to reciientsǯ bank account.56
hat can be underlined from the elanation above is that, since the 
Helsinki MoU, the voices of the victims have not been heard before a TR and 
the eretrators have not been brouht to the court for rosecution and, if 
found uilty, unishment. It shows that after the sinature of the areement, 
not all rovisions have been imlemented. Interestinly enouh, there is no 
ublic comlaint from former 
AM leaders since they refer to maintain 
ood relationshi with Jakarta. Also no massive comlaint from the victims 
and civil societies which seems as if they are enjoyin the eaceful condition 
after the areement and unwillin their comlaint would be maniulated 
for olitical uroses.57 Indeed, the current situation of Aceh, in terms of 
infrastructure and security, seems better than ten years ao. Perhas, this is 
a reason why Acehnese refer to look forward for better future rather than 
to look backward for the ast story.
2. Transitional Justice in Papua
As other arts of Indonesia enjoyed olitical liberalization after the fall 
of President Soeharto in 1998, Pauans have also a chance to eress their 
lon-suressed feelins and asiration throuh ublic rotests reardin 
their future. They raised sensitive issues such as the resonsibility of human 
rihts abuses, the equal distribution of Pauaǯs natural resources revenue, 
self-overnment or self-determination, and even indeendence. To address 
the rievances as well as to weaken the suort for indeendence, the central 
overnment areed to rant a secial autonomy which allows Pauans 
to have reater olitical, economic, and cultural ower as lon as Paua 
remains the art of Indonesia. In 2000, the Peoleǯs onsultative Assembly, 
the uer chamber of arliament, issued a resolution (TAP MPR o. I of 
2000Ȍ statin its aroval to rantin a secial autonomy law to resond 
to Pauan demands and asirations. n 21 ovember 2001, the arliament 
56  Ibid..
57  Scott Cunliơe, et. al., op.cit., p. 22.
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enacted the aw umber 21 of 2001 on Secial Autonomy for the Province 
of Paua ivin Paua self-overnment and secial autonomy. 
The aw is also a leal foundation for the imlementation of transitional 
justice in Paua. Pursuant Article ͠6, entitled ǲHuman Rihtsǳ, there are three 
mechanisms rovided by the aw to address transitional justice in Pauaǣ
1Ȍ A Human Rihts ourt, which would make a contribution to judicial 
accountability for ast violations of human rihts.
2Ȍ A Paua Truth and Reconciliation ommission to clarify and establish 
the history of Paua and formulate and determine reconciliation 
measures. 
3Ȍ A Paua branch of the ational Human Rihts ommission, a body 
that has both a truth-seekin and a judicial accountability function.58
ike the Helsinki MoU of Aceh, the aw accommodates the establishment 
of a TR and a human rihts court for Paua. Interestinly enouh, the idea 
of a TR was not suorted by some activists ǲbecause of the fear that it 
will create conƪict between the various rous Ƥhtin for indeendence 
and weaken the movementǳ.59 As a matter of fact, as in Aceh, a TR was 
never established for Paua since the leal foundation for its establishment 
had been annulled by the onstitutional ourt. The annulment of the aw 
ǲbecame a convenient justiƤcation for not establishin local truth commissions 
for Paua or Aceh, even thouh they were seciƤed in the Secial Autonomy 
aws for both reionsǳ.60
ith resect to the establishment of a human rihts court in Paua, 
the overnment has also failed to comly with the mandate of the Secial 
Autonomy aw. In the absence of a human rihts court for Paua, it is 
diƥcult to seek judicial accountability for ast violations of human rihts in 
Paua. The only ood news for Pauans was the creation a reional Human 
Rihts ourt in Makassar, South Sulawesi, located outside Paua, under 
the aw umber 26 of 1999 which allowed to brinin very limited human 
rihts case before the ourt. The only case heard in this ermanent human 
58  ICTJ and ELSHAM, op.cit., p. 9.
59  Hilmar Farid and Rikardo Simarmatra, op.cit., p. viii.
60  ICTJ and ELSHAM, op.cit., p. 11.
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rihts court was the alleed violations in Abeura, Paua. However, only two 
susects were indicted, even thouh the ational ommission of Human 
Rihts (hereafter referred omnas HAMȌ found many more. Unfortunately, 
both susects were acquitted.61
In fact, it is diƥcult for Pauans to enforce a judicial aroach of ast 
human rihts violations. At least there are two reasons for this. 	irst, there 
are no serious eơorts amon Pauans themselves to brin human rihts 
violations as collective initiatives. They tend to work searately and as a 
consequence it is diƥcult to work toether for a lon term. Second, ǲPauaǯs 
justice system lacks caacityǳ and ǲjudes and rosecutors do not have an 
adequate understandin of human rihts normsǳ.62 Thus, there is a reasonable 
doubt to conduct leitimate human rihts trials.63 Whatever the reasons, the 
fact is, as in Aceh, transitional justice mechanism for Paua has not been 
established aroriately. Besides, in contrast to Aceh, searatist issue in 
Paua is not resolved comletely yet. It remains a sensitive issue until today.
3. Transitional Justice in East Timor
Similar to Aceh and Paua, an oortunity to demand the resonsibility of 
human rihts violations in ast Timor emered only after Indonesia takin a 
ath to democratic transition in 1998. Transitional justice mechanism to deal 
with ast human rihts abuses was rovided as a resonse to international 
ressure to rosecute serious crimes committed in the area soon after the result 
of the referendum released in 1999. Initially, a U ommission of Inquiry 
recommended an international criminal tribunal to rosecute the eretrators 
of mass violations. But, the reresentatives of the Indonesian overnment 
were able to convince the U Security ouncil to ski the recommendation 
and relacin it with national trial. Accordinly, the overnment quickly 
issued a reulation in-lieu-of-aw (known as Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti 
Undang-Undang or PerppuȌ umber 1 of 1999 on Human Rihts ourt, which 
later relaced by the aw umber 26 of 2000, to establish  a mechanism 
61  ICTJ and ELSHAM, loc.cit.; ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 4.
62  Hilmar Farid and Rikardo Simarmatra, op.cit., p. viii.
63  Ibid..
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investiatin and rosecutin ross human rihts abuses in terms of crime 
aainst humanity and enocide, ecludin war crimes.6͠ However, ǲȑlȒike 
all other judicial mechanisms in Indonesia, the Human Rihts ourts are 
strictly domestic enterrisesȄthere is no international articiation in the 
investiation rocess, the rosecution, the defence or on the bench.ǳ65 With 
reard to the mechanism of investiation and rosecution under the aw 
umber 26 of 2000, it is stated thatǣ
omnas HAM may form a ro justicia team to undertake inquiries and 
make Ƥndins on whether ross human rihts violations have been 
committed. If the team Ƥnds ǲsuƥcient reliminary evidence that a 
ross violation of human rihts has occurred,ǳ it has seven days to ass 
the results to the A
, the only body with the ower to conduct a 
formal investiation and rosecution. If the A
 receives the omnas 
HAM reort and declares it to be comlete, rosecutors must then 
comlete an investiation within 90 days. However, the A
 may delay 
the investiation and return the Ƥle to omnas HAM if it Ƥnds the 
evidence insuƥcient.66
An investiation was conducted in Setember 1999 by Human Rihts 
iolations Investiations ommission (Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak 
Asasi Manusiaǣ PP HAMȌ for ast Timor under direction of omnas HAM 
to human rihts abuses committed in ast Timor between January and 
ctober 1999. After conductin riorous cross-eamination of hih-level 
oƥcials and ehumin of the victimǯs bodies, PP HAM sent the Ƥnal 
reort to the A
 in January 2000. The reort found that crimes aainst 
humanity had taken laces committed by the members of military, olice, 
militia and civilian. In resonse to the reort and increasin international 
ressure, the Indonesian President issued a decree to create an ad hoc court 
for ast Timor in accordance with the mandate of the aw umber 26 of 
2000.67 There were 18 mid- and senior-level oƥcials, mostly security forces 
members, chared by the rosecutor and si of them were convicted at trial. 
64  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 38.
65  Suzannah Linton, op.cit., p. 10.
66  ICTJ and Kontras, loc.cit.
67  ICTJ and Kontras, ibid., p. 46.
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But, they were acquitted on aeal, meanin no one had been convicted.68 
In contrast, there were 8͠ convictions and three acquittals decided by the 
U-sonsored trials in Timor-este durin the same eriod for similar cases.69
Another transitional justice mechanism rovided for ast Timor is the 
establishment of truth commissions. In Auust 2005, followin the ressure 
of the U ommission of erts, the Indonesian and Timorese overnments 
areed to establish jointly a truth commission namely the ommission of 
Truth and 	riendshi (T	Ȍ. It was consisted of ten commissioners who 
were aointed roortionally of Ƥve reresentatives from each country. This 
unique commission was the Ƥrst eamle of a TR established bilaterally 
by two countries. The T	 reviewed what have been found by four revious 
mechanismsǣ the Secial Panels for Serious rimes in Dili, the Ad Hoc 
Human Rihts ourt trials in Jakarta, the omnas HAM inquiry, and the 
reort of Timor-esteǯs Truth and Reconciliation ommission (known by its 
Portuuese acronym ARǣ Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação 
de Timor LesteȌ. The Ƥnal reort of the conclusive truth and recommendation 
of the T	 was based on this review. The T	 did not have an authority 
to investiate and rosecute, but allowed to recommend amnesties and 
rehabilitation for cooerative eole in revealin the truth.70
Althouh the establishment of the T	 was criticized and doubted at 
the very beinnin, its Ƥnal reort surrised the oonents. The reort 
was acceted by both President Indonesia and Timor-este, but it was not 
released for ublic.71 The Ƥndins of the T	 couraeously stated thatǣ
Ȉ rimes aainst humanity, includin murder, torture, rae, and forced 
transfer or deortation, were committed throuhout ast Timor in 
1999.
Ȉ These crimes were not sontaneous or random, and were not the 
result of retaliatory actions.
68  Ibid., p. 47.
69  Megan Hirst, Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth: Monitoring report on the Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste, Occasional Paper Series, January 2008, p. 8. Available at [http://ictj.org/].
70  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 26; Suzannah Linton, op.cit., p. 25-26.
71  ICTJ and Kontras, ibid., p. 27.
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Ȉ The main eretrators were ro-autonomy militia rous that tareted 
suorters of indeendence and acted with the involvement and 
suort of the Indonesian military, olice, and civilian authorities. 
Ȉ Indonesian suort for ro-autonomy militia rous included money, 
food, and weaons.72
In liht of this, the establishment of the T	 and its results demonstrated 
the will of both arties (Indonesia and ast TimorȌ to seek neotiation and 
comromise dealin with ast human rihts violations in ast Timor. As 
Mean Hirst observed, ǲthe new nationǯs leaders ȑof ast TimorȒ rioritized 
ood relations with its neihbor Indonesia over the ursuit of justiceǳ.73 In 
this reard, Timorese leaders believed that the ressure of international 
and domestic for accountability reardin the 1999 violations as a threat 
to bilateral relations with Indonesia. In addition, they were aware that 
it was diƥcult to have a broad international suort, esecially from all 
ermanent members of the U Security ouncil, to establish an international 
tribunal iven siniƤcant osition and role of Indonesia for the interests 
of international communities.7͠  Reasonably, ǲȑfȒaced with this reality and 
desirin friendly relations and economic cooeration with Indonesia, the 
Timorese leaders chose not to suort the establishment of an international 
tribunal.ǳ75 Moreover, the ast Timorǯs to olitical leaders had ardoned 
the eretrators of crime aainst humanity who had been sentenced by a 
Dili court. They were freed on arole which means that their terms in jail 
for crimes aainst humanity committed in 1999 were not served fully in 
accordance with the sentence of the court.76 This roves that transitional 
72  Ibid.. 
73  Megan Hirst, op.cit., p. 1.
74  Ibid., p. 1 & 11.
75  Ibid., p. 11.
76  The Sunday Age, “Not diplomatic: was Ramos Horta a contender or a pretender?”, June 29, 2008, p. 8. 
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justice in ast Timor became more reconciliatory than judicially.77 ven thouh 
there was a criticism to such transitional justice aroach, in fact it worked.
III. CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated throuhout this article, the imlementation of 
transitional justice in ost-Soeharto Indonesia is a comle one. Transitional 
justice in Indonesia has been directed to the minimum level only. Unfortunately, 
it is imlemented with half-baked. While there have been eơorts in terms 
of both judicial and non-judicial achieved by the overnment of Indonesia 
to aly transitional justice, the Ƥnal results are not satisfactory. There is no 
serious olitical will to address Indonesiaǯs leacy of human rihts abuses. 
The military, olice, rosecutors, judes, arliament, and even the resident 
suorted the imlementation of transitional justice only with half-hearted. The 
case of Indonesia shows that ǲthe roress has been larely restricted to form, 
but not to action.ǳ78 It is therefore not surrisin that no sinle case has been 
rosecuted successfully durin transitional eriod. As a matter of fact, ǲneither 
Suharto nor any of the hih-rankin oƥcials of the ew rder era have ever 
been ut on trial or held accountable for human rihts abuses durin 32 years 
of authoritarian ruleǳ.79
With reard to the imlementation of Indonesian transitional justice, some 
analysts have come to the same essimistic conclusions eressed in such termsǣ 
ǲde facto amnestyǳ,80 ǲintended to failǳ,81 ǲhas not had a coherent ǲtransitional 
77  Such an approach was also applied by East Timorese political leaders in the implementation of transitional justice in Timor-Leste 
itself. The Timor-Leste’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) including the Community Reconciliation Program (CRP) 
underlined the importance of reconciliatory measure. The application of transitional justice mechanism was highly contested 
by domestic political leaders. A charismatic leader like Xanana Gusmao once said that “the people would forgive former militia 
members if only they received an apology” and he agreed to grant amnesties. See Eva Ottendorfer, “Contesting International 
Norms of Transitional Justice: The Case of Timor Leste”, International Journal of Conƪict and Violence, Vol. 7 (1), 2013, p. 29. In 
addition, a report published by the UNDP Timor-Leste concluded that “[t]he CRP has reinforced the importance of local justice 
mechanism and the notion that justice in Timor Leste not always about punishment, but also compensation, contrition and other 
forms of reciprocity”. See Piers Pigou, The Community Reconciliation Process of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconcili-
ation, Report for UNDP Timor-Leste, April 2004, p. 102. Available at [http://www.cavr-timorleste.org].
78  ICTJ and Kontras, op.cit., p. 84.
79  Ehito Kimura, op.cit..
80  Patrick Burgess, “De Facto Amnesty? The Example of Post-Soeharto Indonesia”,  in Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (ed.), 
Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and International Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012.
81  David Cohen, Intended to Fail: The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights in Jakarta, Occasional Paper Series, International Center 
for Transitional Justice, August 2003. Available at [http://ictj.org/].
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justiceǳ strateyǳ,82 ǲhas larely failedǳ,83 ǲa defensive enforcement aroach in 
romotin human rihtsǳ,8͠ ǲthe culture of imunity and the lack of olitical will 
or courae to brin about justiceǳ,85 and ǲthe failure of international justiceǳ.86 In 
short, a siniƤcant Ƥnal result of Indonesian transitional justice has not been 
achieved and justice has not been done so far.
However, Indonesia is not the only case where the imlementation of 
transitional justice has failed. As Duncan Mcaro illustrates, such a failure has 
also occurred in the cases of ambodia and Thailand. In ambodia, a hybrid 
tribunal namely the traordinary hambers in the ourts of ambodia was 
created for the trial of mass killin durin 1975-1979 committed by hmer Roue 
reime. But the result was not successful. In Thailand, the Truth for Reconciliation 
ommission was formed in order to investiate the deaths of 92 eole durin 
Aril and May 2010 demonstrations committed by the military oƥcers. Similarly, 
the result has also failed. Surrisinly enouh, the ommission blamed the 
demonstrators rather than the military oƥcers. Previously, in order to eamine 
the resurence of searatist violence in the countryǯs Muslim majority southern 
rovinces, the Thai overnment created a ational Reconciliation ommission 
in 2005. But the result was also not satisfactory.87
Indeed, it is diƥcult to imlement transitional justice if old reime actors, 
both civilian and military, still have siniƤcant osition in state institutions and 
olitical inƪuence in olicy makin. In Indonesian case, lustration is not alied 
to revent them from involvin in new transitional reimes. Instead of this, the 
lack of broad and solid ublic suort for transitional justice also made it more 
diƥcult to imlement. Transitional justice is not viewed as the asirations of 
the whole Indonesians, but rather limited to the victims and their family and 
82  Suzannah Linton, op.cit., p. 20.
83  Ehito Kimura, op.cit..
84  Irene Istiningsih Hadiprayitno, “Defensive Enforcement: Human Rights in Indonesia”, Human Rights Review, Vol. 11, 2010, p. 397.
85  Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Politics of Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 37, 
No. 1, February 2007, p. 90-91.
86  Elizabeth F. Drexler, “The Failure of International Justice in East Timor and Indonesia”, in Alexander Laban Hinton (ed.), Transitional 
Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence, New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers 
University Press, 2010.
87  Duncan McCargo, “Transitional Justice and Its Discontents”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 2, April 2015, p. 5 & 16.
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human rihts activists. Meanwhile, international ressures for transitional justice 
are understood by many as an uneected forein intervention.
The case of Indonesia suests the lessons that the imlementation of 
transitional justice is likely to be unsuccessful it there is no etensive suort 
from nation-states actors, national institutions, the majority of citizens, and the 
victims themselves. Unless such obstacles are considered roerly, the eơort to 
resolve ast human rihts abuses will likely to lead to the same mistake and 
failure of justice. To overcome the obstacles, the current overnment have to 
convince them Ƥrst so that they will suort the eơort to resolve ast human 
rihts violations. 	urthermore, in order to resolve ast human rihts violations, it 
is necessary to Ƥrstly fulƤl the minimum level of transitional justice (truth rocess, 
trial rocess, and rearation rocessȌ before suddenly jumin to reconciliation 
rocess. Aruably, justice cannot be brouht to the victims unless such a minimum 
level of transitional justice has been fulƤlled rior to reconciliation.
The lessons above should be considered wisely by the current overnment 
under President Joko Widodo and Vice-President M. Jusuf Kalla who intends 
to resolve ast human rihts abuses as has been romised in their residential 
election camain in 201͠. Since transitional justice measures have not been 
resolved aroriately, ast human rihts abuses would remain a nihtmare for 
the country and even for the enerations. Ultimately, Indonesia cannot run away 
from its own history for better or worse.
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